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BUFFALO LAW REVIPW
were sales "from" the main store and subject to percentage rent. However, some
fur sales were not made "from" the main store, and these were not subject to
percentage rent.
The dissent felt that removal of the fur department was a breach of faith
even though the lease did not specifically require operation of a fur department.
"A promise may be lacking, and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with an
obligation,' imperfectly expressed. ' 25
Where a store was rented on a percentage of gross sales basis, the lessee was
held liable for the percentage on total gross sales even though he moved two
departments into an adjoining building. 2 It has been held that a tenant is not
justified in removing its most lucrative departments to other premises in an
effort to diminish rent which was based on percentage of gross sales. 27 In these
cases, however, there appeared to be an intent to reduce the rent coupled with an
actual reduction. In the instant case the tenant moved because it was necessary
to expand, and in the lower court's decision 28 it was pointed out that sales actually
increased, resulting in higher rent to the landlord.
Distinguishing between sales made as a result of referrals from salespeople
on lower floors and other sales is more difficult to rationalize. The fur department
was advertised downstairs, customers had to board the elevators on the lower
floors, and furs were stored and prepared there. It would seem that these sales,
also, were "from" the main store.
Reopening Tax Foreclosure Defaults
City of New York v. Nelson 29 presented the problem of whether relief may
be afforded a party under section 108 of the Civil Practice Act 30 from a default
judgment in an in rem tax foreclosure action obtained pursuant to the provisions
of the Administrative Code of the City of New York.3 ' The Court held that
section 108 provided for no such relief, even though the city acquired properties
assessed at $52,000 for a total tax arrearage of $887, and though it was no fault of
the owner that the tax was unpaid. The Court felt, "the power to afford relief
25. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordan, 222 N. Y. 88, 91, 118 N. E. 214 (1917).
26. Cissna Loan Co. v. Baron, 149 Wash. 386, 270 Pac. 1022 (1928).
27. Dunham & Co. v. 26 East State Street Realty Co., 134 N. J. Eq. 237,
35 A. 2d
28.
29.
30.

40 (1943).
123 N. Y. S. 2d 349 (1953).
309 N. Y. 94, 127 N. E. 2d 827 (1955).
N. Y. CIV. PRAc. ,Acr § 108, allows a court to relieve a party from a

judgment taken against him "through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect."
31. Tit. D, c. 17.
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here is not confided to the courts. The result suggests the need of legislation
liberalizing the right of redemption, or giving to city officials the power to
ameliorate such extreme hardships in appropriate cases."
The right of redemption in an in rem tax foreclosure action is exclusively
statutory.32 The Administrative Code of the City of New York provides that in
the event of an owner's failure to redeem or answer by a prescribed date, he will
be forever barred and foreclosed of all his right title and interest and e4uity of
33
redemption in the land and a judgment of foreclosure may be taken by default.
34
The courts seem to consider the redemption provision under the State Tax Law,
which is in the nature of a statute of limitations,35 analogous to that of the
Administrative Code of the City of New York. 36 They will not, under either law,
reopen a default judgment.37 This is true though the property owner received no
actual notice of the foreclosure action,38 or was in fact incompetent.3 . It appears
that once the procedural requirements imposed upon the City of New York by
the Administrative Code are substantially fulfilled and a default judgment
obtained, that judgment is valid and no longer subject to attack. 40
Foreclosure Expenses
Civil Practice Act §1087 provides that taxes and assessments whith are
liens upon the property sold at a foreclosure sale are deemed expenses of the sale.
In Wesselman v. Engel Co.,41 the guarantor of a mortgage had guaranteed payment of principal and interest of mortgage together with any and all "expenses
of foreclosure." The Courd held, the guarantee did not include back taxes paid
by the mortgagee. The majority pointed out that §1087 refers to "expenses of the
sale," not "expenses of foreclosure," and that the purpose of this section is to
protect the purchaser on a foreclosure sale, who is entitled to a clear title, rather
than the mortgagee. Therefore, it refers to unpaid taxes which are liens on the
property. In no event can the statute control the meaning of a private guarantee;
32. Keely v. Sanders, 99 U. S. 441 (1878); Levy v. Newman 130 N. Y. 11,
28 N. E. 660 (1891).
33. Administrative Code of the City of New York, tit. D, c. 17-6.0.
34. N. Y. TAX LAw §§ 161-168-d.
35. City of Peekskll v. Perry, 272 App. Div. 940, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 351 (2nd
Dept. 1947).
36. City of New York v. Lynch, 281 App. Div. 1038, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 392 (2nd
Dept. 1953); af 'd, 306 N. Y. 809, 118 N. E. 2d 821 (1954).
37. City of New York v. Jackson-140 Realty Corp., 279 App. Div. 668, 108
N. Y. S. 2d 986 (Md Dep't 1951); see also notes 35 and 36 supra.
38. See note 36 supra.
39. Town of Somers v. Covey, 283 App. Div. 883, 129 N. Y. S. 2d 537 (2nd
Dept. 1954); af 'd, 308 N. Y. 798, 125 N. E. 2d 862 (1955); U. S. Supreme Court
Appeal pending.
40. See note 36 supra.
41. 309 N. Y. 27, 127 N. E. 2d 736 (1955).

